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using fuzzy-set based transformations of civil liberties and political rights. We posit that
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economic reforms. This conclusion is in clear contrast to views that propose a
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reforms are already in place and fully operational.
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1 Introduction
For over two decades now developing countries around the world have been
implementing a range of policy reforms. Chief among these reforms are those related to
trade, which govern to a large extent a country’s economic relations with the rest of the
world. Trade policy reforms are often evaluated (given scores and rankings) by
consultants and economists to determine whether countries are indeed reforming.
Financial reforms have also become popular since the mid-1980s and are subject to
evaluation by investment banks and international financial institutions. Some of the
reforms undertaken by developing countries have come after thorough studies of the
dynamics of their economies, with a significant attention given to regional differences
within the same country and after consulting their constituents. On the other hand, in
other countries, these reforms were hastily decided by the central government or
international lenders with little or no regard to the socioeconomic and institutional
realities in the country adopting the reforms. Two examples from the Maghreb in the
1980s are illustrative of the later type of reforms. In January 1984, the Tunisian
government’s removal of food subsidies as part of the stabilization programme (World
Bank and IMF) resulted in bloody riots and substantial material damage. During the
same month, similar riots took place in Morocco in all major cities. The riots in
Morocco were triggered by rumours that the official proposals (made at the end of the
December 1983) to increase the price of basic commodities, including food, were going
to be implemented. In both countries the social unrest was a response to the fact that
reforms ignored some basic realities. In both economies food items, particularly bread,
tend to have not only an economic (consumption) value but they play a cultural role as
well, especially for the low-income groups.
The way people conduct their daily lives is imbedded in institutions, not policies
dictated by governments or outside organizations. This includes the decision of a
society to rely on exports (see for example, the discussion by North 1991 on how
institutions can help to capture gains from trade). East Asian countries are an illustration
of this. Singapore, for instance, has opted to be export oriented but both its human
capital and its institutions had to adjust to be consistent with this orientation.
It is clear that while the decision to follow specific policies can be subject to influence
from institutions, sometimes policies are recommended or dictated by lenders and
donors and hence governments end up with little or no choice but to implement them.
When institutions are not in tandem with such reforms, expected results may not
materialize. This is one explanation for the frequent breakdown in donor-initiated
reform programmes
A growing body of literature has examined the links between institutions, trade and
income using cross-sectional data. Recent studies include Kaufmann et al. (1999),
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Rodrik et al. (2002), Rodrik (2000a,b, and 2002), and Dollar
and Kraay (2003). The question we want to ask is: ‘do institutions explain why some
countries have benefited from openness to trade and capital (a major aspect of
globalization) while others did not?’ Two directions of research follow from this
question. First, it may be interesting to study why some countries do not seem to have
undertaken appropriate reforms, in the sense that their governments did not implement
the kind of trade policies known (at least in theory or from the experience of some
Asian countries) to be conducive to economic development and growth. A second2
research avenue focuses on those countries that seem to have genuinely opted for this
type of policies but with no significant results. It is our view that this avenue is a more
interesting one to pursue and we conjecture that institutions play an important role in the
success or failure of policy reforms.
Most recent work that tries to explain why some countries have higher integration (more
international trade) have used mainly two variables; geography and institutions and
concluded in favour of the primacy of one variable over the other. Geography is used to
represent the effect of climate, disease incidence, proximity to developed countries,
transportation cost (access to the coast), and so forth. For example, geography is used in
various studies by Sachs and Warner 1995; Sachs and Bloom 1998; Sachs et al. 2000;
Sachs and McArthur 2001) to explain why Africa has very low income and so little
trade with the rest of the world (excluding trade in minerals). The second explanation
has relied on the use of institutional quality, in particular the effect of the rule of law
and property rights.
The empirical evidence reported in the literature is mixed. First, research conducted by
Sachs and Bloom (1998) shows the primacy of geography in explaining cross-country
income differences (and integration). Then, studies by Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2002)
Acemoglu and Robinson (2002), Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik et al. (2002), and
Dollar and Kraay (2003) show the primacy of institutions. As a response to this, Sachs
(2003) comes back to show that geography, after controlling for institutions, directly
affects income.
While there is a great debate on the relationship between trade policy and reforms, and
income or economic growth especially concerning the direction of causality, much less
research has been devoted to the question of what makes trade policy reforms fail to
produce the expected positive effects in some countries.1 More specifically, why is it
that a country which is open to international trade and capital (given its import/export
regulations and incentives to FDI) and which is free of the ‘á-la-Sachs geography
handicap’, and endowed with labour surplus does not increase its integration in world
markets?
The present paper contends that the answer lies in the ‘institutional quality’ that is
predominant in the country. This proposition is subjected to empirical tests using data
from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. It is worth noting that all three Maghreb countries
have the same colonial heritage (France) and similar racial composition (Arabs and
Berbers) and languages (Arabic, Berber and French). In all three countries, French is the
business language. Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia all have strong economic ties with the
European Union. However, Morocco is currently negotiating a free trade agreement
with the United States, which makes this analysis very timely. Finally, both Morocco
and Tunisia have been pursuing significant economic reforms, including trade policy
reforms, since the second half of the 1980s. Thus, the contrast with the experience of
Algeria should yield some interesting insights. Moreover, the type of institutions built
by the French colonial administration in Morocco and Tunisia is consistent with the
proposition held in Acemoglu et al. (2003); in the sense that colonial powers
(Europeans) ‘were more likely to introduce extractive institutions in regions where they
                                                
1 Stein (1994) and Aron (1997) both provide interesting discussions on institutions and economic
reform in Africa. Also Williamson (1998) argues that ‘privatization efforts are very much affected by
contracts and governance’, which constitute specific types of a country’s institutions.3
did not plan to settle’. However, the French had planned to settle in Algeria and, indeed,
annexed the country to the French Territoire. According to the contention in Acemoglu
et al., Algeria should have emerged with better institutions. The historical facts since
independence in the early 1960s indicate that this was not the case. In fact, Algeria has
much worse institutions than Morocco or Tunisia.
By focusing on the Maghreb region, the geography-based explanation of
underdevelopment is no longer valid. In fact, the location of the three countries should
constitute an advantage. Thus, it is a more interesting exercise to submit the second
proposition (role of institutions) to analysis. The remainder of the paper is laid out as
follows. In the next section we discuss reforms and institutions and their role in
economic growth and development. Section 3 presents some useful insights on the role
of political freedom, property rights and contract rights in ensuring the expected
investment response to specific economic reforms. Section 4 describes the data and
methodology employed in the empirical estimation. We analyse the econometric results
in section 5. Finally, in section 6 we provide concluding comments.
2 Reforms and institutions
The fact that certain policies may not produce the expected results because of
differences in institutions across countries is not surprising. Discussing institutions,
North (1991: 97) states that
[t]hey evolve incrementally, connecting the past to the present, and the future;
history in consequence is largely a story of institutional evolution in which the
historical performance of economies can only be understood as a part of a
sequential story. Institutions provide the incentive structure of an economy; as that
structure evolves, it shapes the direction of economic change towards growth,
stagnation, or decline.
Economic institutions can also be viewed as ‘norms of economic behaviour’ (see for
example Matthews 1986, and Nee and Ingram 1998). If we subscribe to this view, we
need to ask whether a country’s economic institutions serve as reinforcement or as a
deterrent to its integration in the world economy.2 If when conducting business, the type
of institutions that exist in a country helps to lower transaction costs, then we would
expect more business (see Coase 1998). This would be the case in some societies where
an individual does not need collateral to borrow from his neighbour or the tribe chief for
example. Individuals in this type of society would find it unattractive (or impossible) to
conduct international business (trade) since the way such business is conducted is not
consistent with their norms of economic behaviour. Thus, in spite of trade policy
reforms, we may not see a great improvement in integration with the rest of the world
economy.
There is some empirical evidence in the literature in support of the role of institutions in
promoting economic growth and trade. Dollar and Kraay (2003: 160) argue that ‘rapid
growth in the very long run, high levels of trade and good institutions go together’.
Clarke (2001) shows that institutional quality is positively correlated with R&D
                                                
2 For example, using cross sections, Mayda and Rodrik (2002) show that institutions ‘play an important
role in explaining the variation in preference over trade’.4
expenditures. To the extent that this type of expenditures improves a country’s ability to
benefit from globalization, institutional quality may be crucial. Rodrik et al. (2002)
show that the contribution of institutions to income is stronger than that of geography
and trade. Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that institutional quality causes
income not the other way around.
Good institutions also may help countries deal with shocks. For example, Johnson et al.
(2000) report that ‘among emerging economies open to international capital, those with
weaker political and financial institutions experienced more severe crises in the late
1990s’. Thus, the interaction between shocks and institutions can be crucial. Similarly,
Acemoglu et al. (2003) show that countries that have weak institutions (defined as lack
of constraint on the executive and ineffective enforcement of property rights) tend to
pursue poor macroeconomic policies.
3 Political freedom, property rights, and contract rights
Property and contract rights are crucial to the investment response that we can expect
from any reform that changes relative prices in product markets (trade reform affecting
the relative incentives to invest in producing exportables versus importables, for
example) or which lifts restrictions on the operation of private enterprise (financial
reform which reduces entry costs on establishing private banks, for example).
Moreover, the extent to which property and contract rights are respected or not also
affects whether entrepreneurs invest in activities which have large immediate fixed
costs and long time-horizons before the profits are realized. When property and contract
rights are insecure, entrepreneurs have high private discount rates, and therefore avoid
investments characterized by long time-horizons and up-front fixed costs. Trade, which
has low fixed costs and requires mostly working capital, therefore comes to
predominate over production; merchants rather than factory owners are the wealthy
class (Richards and Waterbury 1996).
One view is that the protection of political rights—civil rights, freedom of expression
and so forth—can be separated from the protection of property and contract rights. Thus
Barro (1996) argues that autocrats can raise living standards provided that they respect
and enforce property and contract rights, thereby providing a favourable climate for
private long-term investment. However, this view is challenged by Clague et al. (1996)
who unpack the incentives facing an autocrat. A utility-maximizing autocrat who is
secure in his power will have a long time-horizon and can gain from granting protection
to property and contract rights. But if his time-horizon is short, then he gains more by
expropriation. There are historical examples of each type of autocrat.
In contrast, a longstanding democracy will have institutions that limit individual
behaviour to within the law. The system will have maintained itself because leaders,
while self-interested, also want to get elected. They have incentives to comply with
electoral and constitutional law and other actors, particularly in the legal system, will
have incentives to ensure that politicians abide by the law. But in new democracies this
web of institutions may be barely evident. An active civil society may exist (local
NGOs, the church, possibly a trade union movement) but the system of formal laws
governing political practice will be new, often underdeveloped and, critically, untested.5
In new democracies, elected leaders face fewer constraints and it may be in their self-
interest to subvert property and contract rights, either because such rights cut against
their personal interests or because they can improve their prospects for re-election. So
whether the leaders of a new democracy act to protect property and contract rights is
critical to whether the democratic transition proves conducive or not to investment and
growth. Thus Clague et al. (1996) conclude that:
... in autocracies it is the time-horizon of the individual autocrat (or occasionally
the ruling clique) that is the main determinant of property and contract rights,
whereas in democracies these rights depend on whether the democratic system is
durable ... Any autocratic society will sooner or later come to have rulers with
short time-horizons due to succession crises or other causes. We therefore
hypothesize that democracies that have lasted for some time and expected to last
much longer provide better property and contract rights than any other type of
regime (Clague et al. 1996: 246, emphasis in the original).
Their empirical results confirm the hypothesis that long-lasting democracy provides
better protection for property and contract rights, and is therefore better for economic
development than autocracy. But their results also show that these benefits take time to
appear: property and contract rights are often poor in new democracies, sometimes
substantially poorer than when the countries concerned were autocracies (Clague et al.
1996: 271). If the arguments of Clague et al. (1996) are correct, then it may no longer
be the case, as Barro (1996, 2000) argues that political rights and freedoms can be
separated from rights to property and contract rights. It follows that economic reform is
more likely to be effective in democracies than autocracies, although there will always
be individual examples of autocracies where the autocrat considers limited reform to be
in his personal interest.
4 Data and methodology
The methodology consists of using panel data spanning 27 years from the three
Maghreb nations and assessing the effect that institutions have on the success of
reforms. Our first choice of a measure of institutional quality was the index of property
rights constructed by the Heritage Foundation (1995-2001). Property rights are believed
to be superior to other proxies of institutional quality (see, for example, the work of
Kaufmann et al., 2002 on governance and the index of institutional quality). However,
this gives us a fairly small sample (21 observations). Given that we need a larger sample
size (many years), we resort to the use of a composite index of political rights3 and civil
liberties. Data for this index are obtained from Freedom in the World Tables (2002)
produced by Freedom House. The model also includes income and illiteracy rates to
proxy for human capital. Data on per capita income ($ PPP), M2, exports, imports, GDP
and adult illiteracy rates are from the World Bank—World Development Indicators CD-
ROM (2002). Trade openness (trade reform) is defined as the ratio of the sum of
imports and exports to GDP. Financial reform is defined as the ratio of broad money
(M2) to GDP. This indicator measures financial deepening, which is often the most
                                                
3 North (1981) provides an insightful discussion of the role of political conditions in the development of
efficient property rights.6
important result of financial reforms.4 In this study institutional quality is defined as the
average score of civil liberties and political rights scores. This is referred to as ‘non-
transformed score’ in Table 1b. These or similar measures have been used in the
literature as indicators of institutional quality.
We believe previous studies suffer from a major weakness; they treat the variable
‘institutional quality’ as a crisp concept, while in reality it is fuzzy. As argued by
Matthews (1986: 917), ‘Because economic institutions are complex, they do not lend
themselves easily to quantitative measurement ... Examples of it do exist, the literature
on the economics of slavery being perhaps the most fully developed, because slavery is
an institution that is sharply defined’. Thus, we are faced with institutions as a fuzzy
concept that does not lend itself to modelling techniques that apply to crisp outcomes or
events, but rather require the use of fuzzy sets.5
The concept of fuzzy sets was developed by Lotfi Zadeh (1965). Zadeh defines fuzzy
sets as ‘a class of objects with a continuum of grades of membership’. While the early
applications of fuzzy logic were in science and engineering such as biology and
artificial intelligence, fuzzy-set theory has more recently been increasingly applied to
many issues in various social science and business fields.6 Degrees of membership or
compliance with goals are typically expressed by numbers belonging to the interval
[0,1]. Fuzzy sets permit us to model gradual transition from membership to non-
membership and vice versa. It is a concept that permits a meaningful representation of
ambiguous and vague objects or outcomes. Fuzzy sets are appropriate if we want to
assess the quality of institutions in a country. What is the degree of membership of a
country that has some property right protection in the set of ‘complete property right
protection’? It cannot be zero but we cannot say that the country has complete property
right protection because that would amount to treating Morocco the same way we treat
Canada, for example. Our analysis takes this into account. We develop a new measure
of institutional quality by considering the membership of each country in the set of
‘institutional quality’, and derive membership degrees which we use to obtain ‘scores’
to be used as our indices for institutional quality.
Using the fuzzy-set technique described in Appendix A we compute fuzzy-set
transformed scores and we use equation (3) in Appendix A to derive degrees of
membership in the set of ‘institutional quality’ under several scenarios. In equation (3)
the slope a represents the extent of vagueness. The parameter b represents the threshold
at which a country changes from rather ‘not free’ to a rather ‘free’; i.e., this parameter
serves as the identification threshold. Once we obtain values for a and b (Table 1a), we
proceed to compute the degree of membership (achievement) with regard to institutional
quality (Table 1b). We obtain different sets of these scores based on six scenarios. To be
consistent with Freedom House we consider the highest score, which is 7, as the worst
outcome (i.e.; poorest institutional quality), and the lowest score, which is 1, as the best
outcome.
                                                
4 See Baliamoune and Chowdhury (2003) for a through discussion of the role of financial liberalization
in promoting private saving in Morocco.
5 Also, Scully (1988) argues that there is need for ‘richer measures of institutional framework’.
6 Baliamoune (2000) used fuzzy-sets to model the G-7 countries’ compliance with the G-7 summit
commitments. Cheli (1995) and Cheli and Lemmi (1995) applied fuzzy-set theory to the computation
of poverty indicators.7
Scenario 1
The degree of membership in the set of ‘institutional quality’ of the highest score is set
to 1. One may view this as ‘belonging a 100 per cent in this set’, or just make the
highest score a ratio to the highest possible outcome, which is 7. This yields a
membership degree (µh ) equal to 1 (or 7/7). However, for computation feasibility we
change this to 0.99. The membership (µl) of a country with the lowest score of 1 is the
ratio of 1 to 7 or 0.1428.
Scenario 2
According to Freedom House, countries with a combined average score between 1 and
2.5 are considered to be ‘free’. In scenario 2 we take the average score (and lower) as
the best outcome. Thus, µl is equal to the ratio of 1.75 to 7, or 0.25. We keep µh as
defined in scenario 1. It is worth noting that, as shown in Table 1a, the extent of
vagueness slope a and the identification threshold (parameter b) have increased (relative
to their levels in scenario 1) but only very slightly.
Scenario 3
In this scenario we consider the upper boundary of the range ‘free’ (1.0-2.5) as the best
outcome and assign it a membership µl equal to 0.375 (or 2.5/7). We reduce µh to 0.95 in
order to lower the degree of vagueness.
Scenario 4
We set µh equal to 0.8. This implies that a country with a membership degree equal to
0.8 or higher would have experienced the worst outcome (completely not free), whereas
a country with a score close to zero is considered to be perfectly free.  However,
because we have decreased the value of µl to 0.000, the extent of vagueness has
increased. This would allow us to factor in a higher level of fuzziness.
Scenario 5
This scenario has the same µl as in scenario 3 (µl = 0.375) but we raised µh to 0.99 .
Scenario 6
This scenario is a revision of scenario 4; µl remains the same but we have increased µh
from 0.8 to 0.99. Note that because µl is extremely low, this revision has only a very
small effect on the degree of vagueness.
As can be observed from the numbers associated with the six scenarios (Table 1a), it is
more useful to focus on the cases that exhibit different degrees of vagueness (slope a)
and/or identification thresholds (parameter b). Indeed, using scenarios 3, 4 and 5 can
help us conduct a sensitivity analysis to examine whether different assumptions would
lead to different conclusions. We also use the non-transformed scores in our empirical
analysis. The numbers in Table 1b indicate that the scores can serve to reflect one’s
views of whether ‘partly free’ is an acceptable outcome. For example, under scenario 4
the index for Morocco in the late 1970s (0.03) suggests that being partly free is a great
achievement. Whereas under scenario 3 the index for the same period is 0.565, implying
that being partly free is not enough since the score is more than half way from zero (the
index for completely free).8
In order to gain an understanding of the extent of association between the variables used
in the empirical estimation, we compute the relevant correlation coefficients. The
correlation matrix is displayed in Table 2. It is based on the scores derived under
scenario 3 but using scores from other scenarios yields similar results. The coefficients
indicate that there is a positive, though not very strong, correlation between income on
the one hand, and institutions, financial reforms and exports on the other. As expected,
there is a very significant (-0.90) negative correlation between income and adult
illiteracy. However, most other correlation coefficients are quite weak.
5 Discussion of estimation results
The empirical tests are based on fixed-effects estimations. We begin the analysis by
exploring the effects of institutions, reforms and human capital on income and report the
econometric results in Table 3. Four equations are estimated. Equation (1) uses non-
transformed scores as a measure of institutional quality. Equations (2)-(4) use the fuzzy-
based scores derived under scenarios 3, 4 and 5, respectively. Oddly, the coefficient on
institutional quality is either statistically insignificant or shows up with the wrong
(positive) sign; a worsening of institutions causes higher income. This result however
may be explained by the fact that Algeria, which is an oil (natural gas) exporting
country, enjoys a higher income while having worse institutions. Also, the time-series
dimension of the model may not capture the effects of recessions and terms of trade
deterioration on income. In the presence of such adverse shocks, good institutions may
not be able to completely counter the negative effects on income. The indicators of
financial and trade reforms have coefficients with the correct (positive) signs and are
statistically highly significant in all four equations. Similarly, illiteracy has a negative
effect on income and its coefficient is significant at the 1-per cent level.
Table 4 displays the results from estimating the effects of institutions and human capital
on trade reforms. We also include an interactive term to capture the interaction between
financial reforms and institutions. The results do not yield strong support to the
influence of those variables on trade reforms, but the coefficient on the interactive term
is significant in equations 3 and 4 (at the 10-per cent level) and has a negative sign. The
negative sign suggests that bad institutions delay or negate the effect of financial reform
and this, in turn, has adverse effects on trade reforms.
Tables 5 through 8 report econometric results from estimating the effects of institutional
quality and other variables on financial reform. In Table 5 we substitute the lagged
value of institutional quality for its level to try to capture the idea that sometimes
institutional change precedes reform (although institutions in the Maghreb have changed
very little from year to year). We also use the lagged value of income to estimate the
influence of income on financial reform while trying to avoid the problem of
endogeneity. The econometric results show, as expected, a positive effect of good
institutions (lower score) and higher income on financial reform. All coefficients in the
four equations are significant at the 1-per cent level.
The results in Table 6 indicate that good institutions have a positive influence on
financial reform in all equations. It is worth noting that the coefficient on illiteracy is
negative, reflecting the role of human capital in this type of reforms. Similar results are
obtained from the estimation reported in Table 7, where the lagged value of institutions
is used instead of the level.9
Thus far, it seems that most equations yield the same conclusions. However, it is useful
to explore whether there is a threshold level or a saturation effect to good institutions.
Perhaps being partly free is all that a country needs. The empirical results displayed in
Table 8 could help us to examine the possibility of such an idea. We keep illiteracy in
the model to control for the effect of human capital and income (since illiteracy and
income are highly correlated). The coefficients on institutional quality and on its square
are not statistically significant in equations 1 and 4 but are highly significant in the other
two equations.
We may use the results in Table 8 (equations 2-4) to solve for maxima and link them to
the corresponding non-transformed (Freedom House) scores in Table 1b. If we assume
that adult illiteracy does not change significantly, at least in the short run, then the
maximum level is reached at the value of institutional quality (fuzzy-set transformed)
equal to 0.648, 0.778, and 0.282 in equations 2, 3 and 4; respectively. A fuzzy-
transformed score of 0.648 corresponds to a Freedom House combined score slightly
lower than 4.0. Similarly, according to the numbers in Table 1b, the fuzzy-transformed
score of 0.778 corresponds to a non-transformed score slightly higher than 4.0. Finally,
a fuzzy-transformed score of 0.282 is associated with a Freedom House combined score
between 4.0 and 4.5.
It is worth noting that the statistical significance of the coefficients on institutional
quality in equation 4 is very weak. Thus, it is more useful to focus on the results from
estimating equations 2 and 3. According to these results, as institutional quality
improves, reforms are enhanced but only up to a certain point, beyond which reforms
are weakened. How plausible are these results? Let us contemplate some possible
explanations. First, it is quite useful to keep in mind that Freedom House (and indeed
many researchers in this area) considers that countries whose combined average scores
are between 3.0 and 5.5 to be ‘partly free’. A score of 4.0 just happens to be very close
to the middle of the range (4.25). The first possible explanation for the results from the
estimation of equations 2 and 3 may reside in the nature of governance and institutions
in the Maghreb. Although the region (Morocco and Tunisia in particular) have come a
long way from the era of dictatorship that was predominant in the 1960s and 1970s,
there is still evidence of corruption and human right abuse. Perhaps as more freedom is
allowed, citizens of these countries begin to oppose reforms that they may (rightly or
wrongly) perceive as benefiting the minority in power and/or in control of the country’s
wealth. Hence, much higher levels of civil liberties and political freedom would be
associated with a set back in reforms.
Alternatively, the econometric results may reflect causality from reforms to institutional
quality. More reforms enhance liberalization and the government may try to curb civil
liberties and other types of freedom so that ‘things do not get out of hand’. In other
words, and as sad as it may sound, some governments may believe that there is a need
to protect reforms from ‘too many political and civil liberties’. This would be consistent
with the proposition of ‘getting their house in order before implementing reforms’. This
does not imply that protecting reforms in this fashion will lead to their success. The
experience of Morocco, in particular, suggests that without the support of the right
institutions, reforms will not have the expected impact on economic growth and
development.
A final explanation could be simply the short history of reforms and the relatively poor
quality of institutions in the Maghreb and the time span of the data. It is possible that the10
quadratic function in equations 2 and 3 becomes a cubic function in a longer time
period7 and with more improvement in the institutional quality; with a minimum in the
neighbourhood of low scores (better institutions) and a maximum in the neighbourhood
of 4.0. This would imply that as institutional quality improves significantly from ‘partly
free’ to ‘free’, reforms become more successful. In fact, the third explanation of the
empirical results in Table 4 (equations 2 and 3) is rather highly plausible, as we know
that none of the three countries has ever improved its institutions beyond the ‘partly
free’ state. Morocco has achieved the best record so far; an average combined score of
3.5 in the late 1970s, which is still within the ‘partly free’ range.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have tried to explore the role of institutions in the success of reforms in
the three Maghreb countries. Two of these countries, namely Morocco and Tunisia,
have embarked on significant economic reforms in the second half of the 1980s.
However, they do not seem to be able to achieve the kind of take-off reached by East
Asian countries. We believe that the weak institutions that are predominant in the
Maghreb have hindered the success of reforms. After computing measures of
institutional quality based on fuzzy-set theory, we have subjected this proposition to
several empirical tests. The econometric evidence tends to lend support to our view.
Our research constitutes an important contribution to the literature in at least three
respects. First, the use of fuzzy-set theory to derive an index for institutional quality is
completely novel. Second, this is the first time an investigation of the effect of
institutions on reforms in developing countries is conducted using panel data
(Acemoglu et al. 2001; Rodrik et al. 2002; Easterly and Levine 2003, and Dollar and
Kraay 2003, all use cross sectional data) which is known to be superior to cross-
sectional analysis since it allows us to capture the dynamics arising from changes in
trade policy and institutions. Third, by focusing on a homogenous region, such as the
Maghreb, we avoid the inclusion of dummies for colonial heritage or language (since all
three countries are former French colonies) and the inclusion of geography (Sachs
2003); and thus we do not need to worry about endogeneity problems and search for
suitable instrumental variables (IV). This is, indeed, a common problem in most other
studies.8
The empirical results are in support of the findings in Dollar and Kraay (2003) and
show that institutions affect the outcome of trade policy reforms. Moreover, they also
influence financial reforms. We may also view our conclusions as consistent with the
findings in different works by Acemoglu et al. and Rodrik et al.—that institutions do
matter. We hope that these results can be used in future research in order to gain useful
insights as to why Algeria has lagged behind Morocco and Tunisia in terms of reforms
and institutions. According to the proposition developed in Acemoglu et al. (2001), due
to its particular position in France’s history of colonization and as an extension of the
French Territory where the French had settled, Algeria should have emerged with much
better institutions.
                                                
7 We have experimented with the cubic form using the same data but the results were not qualitatively
superior to those reported in Table 8.
8 See comments in Pritchett (2003).11
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Appendix A
When comparing outcomes or achievements to goals we may view the distance between
the achievement and the goal as an indicator of the extent of the success in meeting the
target (achievement or underachievement). If d(x) = 0, there is full membership








Noting that, in general, the relationship between physical objects and perceptions takes
an exponential form (see Zimmermann 1987), d(x) can be expressed as:
) ( ) (
b x a e x d









The parameters a and b can be derived as follows. Let µh be the membership degree of
the highest achievement (xh) of the goal. Similarly, let µl be the membership degree of
the lowest achievement (xl) of the goal. From equation (3), and given µh and µl , we can
solve for a and b.
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Deriving the parameters a and b
  µ h µ l ab
Scenario 1 0.99 0.1429 7.5393 0.3805
Scenario 2 0.99 0.2500 7.6942 0.3928
Scenario 3 0.95 0.3571 5.9580 0.4558
Scenario 4 0.8 0.0000 16.1242 0.7140
Scenario 5 0.99 0.3571 8.1897 0.4289
Scenario 6 0.99 0.0000 16.2709 0.7076Table 1b
Institutional quality scores
Freedom House scores Scenario 1* Scenario 2* Scenario 3* Scenario 4* Scenario 5* Scenario 6*
ALG MOR TUN ALG MOR TUN ALG MOR TUN ALG MOR TUN ALG MOR TUN ALG MOR TUN ALG MOR TUN
1972 6 4.5 5.5 0.973 0.878 0.955 0.973 0.873 0.954 0.916 0.753 0.877 0.910 0.241 0.761 0.971 0.852 0.949 0.919 0.259 0.781
1973 6 5 5.5 0.973 0.925 0.955 0.973 0.922 0.954 0.916 0.823 0.877 0.910 0.501 0.761 0.971 0.912 0.949 0.919 0.527 0.781
1974 6 5 5.5 0.973 0.925 0.955 0.973 0.922 0.954 0.916 0.823 0.877 0.910 0.501 0.761 0.971 0.912 0.949 0.919 0.527 0.781
1975 6.5 5 5.5 0.984 0.925 0.955 0.984 0.922 0.954 0.944 0.823 0.877 0.970 0.501 0.761 0.984 0.912 0.949 0.973 0.527 0.781
1976 6 5 5.5 0.973 0.925 0.955 0.973 0.922 0.954 0.916 0.823 0.877 0.910 0.501 0.761 0.971 0.912 0.949 0.919 0.527 0.781
1977 6 3.5 5.5 0.973 0.711 0.955 0.973 0.695 0.954 0.916 0.565 0.877 0.910 0.031 0.761 0.971 0.642 0.949 0.919 0.033 0.781
1978 6 3.5 5.5 0.973 0.711 0.955 0.973 0.695 0.954 0.916 0.565 0.877 0.910 0.031 0.761 0.971 0.642 0.949 0.919 0.033 0.781
1979 6 3.5 5.5 0.973 0.711 0.955 0.973 0.695 0.954 0.916 0.565 0.877 0.910 0.031 0.761 0.971 0.642 0.949 0.919 0.033 0.781
1980 6 4 5.5 0.973 0.808 0.955 0.973 0.798 0.954 0.916 0.666 0.877 0.910 0.091 0.761 0.971 0.763 0.949 0.919 0.098 0.781
1981 6 4.5 5 0.973 0.878 0.925 0.973 0.873 0.922 0.916 0.753 0.823 0.910 0.241 0.501 0.971 0.852 0.912 0.919 0.259 0.527
1982 6 4.5 5 0.973 0.878 0.925 0.973 0.873 0.922 0.916 0.753 0.823 0.910 0.241 0.501 0.971 0.852 0.912 0.919 0.259 0.527
1983 6 4.5 5 0.973 0.878 0.925 0.973 0.873 0.922 0.916 0.753 0.823 0.910 0.241 0.501 0.971 0.852 0.912 0.919 0.259 0.527
1984 6 4.5 5 0.973 0.878 0.925 0.973 0.873 0.922 0.916 0.753 0.823 0.910 0.241 0.501 0.971 0.852 0.912 0.919 0.259 0.527
1985 6 4.5 5 0.973 0.878 0.925 0.973 0.873 0.922 0.916 0.753 0.823 0.910 0.241 0.501 0.971 0.852 0.912 0.919 0.259 0.527
1986 6 4.5 5.5 0.973 0.878 0.955 0.973 0.873 0.954 0.916 0.753 0.877 0.910 0.241 0.761 0.971 0.852 0.949 0.919 0.259 0.781
1987 6 4.5 5.5 0.973 0.878 0.955 0.973 0.873 0.954 0.916 0.753 0.877 0.910 0.241 0.761 0.971 0.852 0.949 0.919 0.259 0.781
1988 5.5 4.5 5 0.955 0.878 0.925 0.954 0.873 0.922 0.877 0.753 0.823 0.761 0.241 0.501 0.949 0.852 0.912 0.781 0.259 0.527
1989 5 4.4 4 0.925 0.866 0.808 0.922 0.860 0.798 0.823 0.737 0.666 0.501 0.201 0.091 0.912 0.837 0.763 0.527 0.217 0.098
1990 4 4.4 4.5 0.808 0.866 0.878 0.798 0.860 0.873 0.666 0.737 0.753 0.091 0.201 0.241 0.763 0.837 0.852 0.098 0.217 0.259
1991 4 5.5 5 0.808 0.955 0.925 0.798 0.954 0.922 0.666 0.877 0.823 0.091 0.761 0.501 0.763 0.949 0.912 0.098 0.781 0.527
1992 6.5 6.5 5.5 0.984 0.984 0.955 0.984 0.984 0.954 0.944 0.944 0.877 0.970 0.970 0.761 0.984 0.984 0.949 0.973 0.973 0.781
1993 6.5 5 5.5 0.984 0.925 0.955 0.984 0.922 0.954 0.944 0.823 0.877 0.970 0.501 0.761 0.984 0.912 0.949 0.973 0.527 0.781
1994 7 5 5.5 0.991 0.925 0.955 0.991 0.922 0.954 0.962 0.823 0.877 0.990 0.501 0.761 0.991 0.912 0.949 0.991 0.527 0.781
1995 6 5 5.5 0.973 0.925 0.955 0.973 0.922 0.954 0.916 0.823 0.877 0.910 0.501 0.761 0.971 0.912 0.949 0.919 0.527 0.781
1996 6 5 5.5 0.973 0.925 0.955 0.973 0.922 0.954 0.916 0.823 0.877 0.910 0.501 0.761 0.971 0.912 0.949 0.919 0.527 0.781
1997 6 5 5.5 0.973 0.925 0.955 0.973 0.922 0.954 0.916 0.823 0.877 0.910 0.501 0.761 0.971 0.912 0.949 0.919 0.527 0.781
1998 5.5 4.5 5.5 0.955 0.878 0.955 0.954 0.873 0.954 0.877 0.753 0.877 0.761 0.241 0.761 0.949 0.852 0.949 0.781 0.259 0.781
1999 5.5 4.5 5.5 0.955 0.878 0.955 0.954 0.873 0.954 0.877 0.753 0.877 0.761 0.241 0.761 0.949 0.852 0.949 0.781 0.259 0.781
2000 5.5 4.5 5.5 0.955 0.878 0.955 0.954 0.873 0.954 0.877 0.753 0.877 0.761 0.241 0.761 0.949 0.852 0.949 0.781 0.259 0.781
* To compute a fuzzy-set transformed index (score) we first take the non-transformed score and divide it by the highest possible score 7. The resulting number becomes the value of





Exports Imports Income Institutions M2/GDP
Imports 0.809524
Income 0.312035 -0.1077
Institutions 0.299493 0.010773 0.395804
M2/GDP -0.30666 -0.4775 0.375254 0.241785
Illiteracy -0.5563 -0.19503 -0.90112 -0.36911 -0.08729
Table 3
Fixed-effect model







































Algeria 9.026*** 8.945*** 8.865*** 9.107***
Morocco 9.075*** 8.999*** 8.919*** 9.159***
Tunisia 8.690*** 8.604*** 8.519*** 8.768***
No. of observations 72 72 72 72
Adjusted R
2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
F-test 23406 25844 26888 24465
Notes: * indicates significance at 0.1, ** indicates significance at 0.05 and *** indicates significance at
0.01. White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
a Equation (1) uses the average scores (civil liberty and political rights) published by Freedom
House without any further transformation. These are the scores in columns labelled ‘Freedom
House scores’ in Table 1b. Equation (2) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under
scenario 3. Equation (3) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under scenario 4. Equation
(4) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under scenario 5.18
Table 4
Fixed-effect model


































Algeria 60.292*** 61.762*** 68.886*** 55.581***
Morocco 54.885*** 56.294*** 63.383*** 49.721***
 Tunisia 82.382*** 83.731*** 90.300*** 77.675***
No. of observations 81 81 81 81
Adjusted R
2 0.801 0.802 0.820 0.804
F-test 65.59 65.99 74.02 66.65
Notes: * indicates significance at 0.1, ** indicates significance at 0.05 and *** indicates significance at
0.01. White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
a Equation (1) uses the average scores (civil liberty and political rights) published by Freedom
House without any further transformation. These are the scores in columns labelled ‘Freedom
House scores’ in Table 1b. Equation (2) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under
scenario 3. Equation (3) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under scenario 4. Equation
(4) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under scenario 5.
b This term is added in order to capture the interaction between institutional quality and reforms.
Table 5
Fixed-effect model























Algeria -11.439*** -10.539*** 1.311*** -21.195***
Morocco -18.282*** -16.649*** -3.475*** -27.700***
Tunisia -24.607*** -23.001*** -10.446*** -33.907***
No. of observations 72 72 72 72
Adjusted R
2 0.979 0.979 0.980 0.978
F-test 843.49 841.37 890.81 858.76
Notes:  * indicates significance at 0.1, ** indicates significance at 0.05 and *** indicates significance at
0.01. White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
a Equation (1) uses the average scores (civil liberty and political rights) published by Freedom
House without any further transformation. These are the scores in columns labelled ‘Freedom
House scores’ in Table 1b. Equation (2) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under
scenario 3. Equation (3) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under scenario 4. Equation
(4) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under scenario 5.19
Table 6
Fixed-effect model























Algeria 97.474*** 100.851*** 105.580*** 82.822***
Morocco 88.942*** 93.108*** 98.420*** 74.871***
Tunisia 79.797*** 84.068*** 89.268*** 65.848***
No. of observations 81 81 81 81
Adjusted R
2 0.987 0.989 0.988 0.988
F-test 1644.47 1673.03 1609.49 1640.58
Notes: * indicates significance at 0.1, ** indicates significance at 0.05 and *** indicates significance at
0.01. White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
a Equation (1) uses the average scores (civil liberty and political rights) published by Freedom
House without any further transformation. These are the scores in columns labelled ‘Freedom
House scores’ in Table 1b. Equation (2) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under
scenario 3. Equation (3) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under scenario 4. Equation
(4) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under scenario 5.
Table 7
 Fixed-effect model























Algeria 95.382*** 97.477*** 100.480*** 83.034***
Morocco 87.018*** 89.897*** 93.465*** 75.059***
Tunisia 77.712*** 80.581*** 83.973*** 65.916***
No. of observations 84 84 84 84
Adjusted R
2 0.984 0.983 0.983 0.984
F-test 1282.71 1275.67 1227.61 1640.58
Notes: * indicates significance at 0.1, ** indicates significance at 0.05 and *** indicates significance at
0.01. White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
a Equation (1) uses the average scores (civil liberty and political rights) published by Freedom
House without any further transformation. These are the scores in columns labelled ‘Freedom
House scores’ in Table 1b. Equation (2) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under
scenario 3. Equation (3) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under scenario 4. Equation
(4) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under scenario 5.20
Table 8
Fixed-effect model
































Algeria 95.382*** 42.223*** -28.682*** 80.220***
Morocco 87.018*** 33.723*** -36.687*** 73.748***
Tunisia 77.712*** 24.464*** -45.999***  62.8671***
No. of observations 81 81 81 81
Adjusted R
2 0.988 0.987 0.988 0.936
F-test 1277.51 1265.27 1312.54 1640.58
Notes:  * indicates significance at 0.1, ** indicates significance at 0.05 and *** indicates significance at
0.01. White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
a Equation (1) uses the average scores (civil liberty and political rights) published by Freedom
House without any further transformation. These are the scores in columns labelled ‘Freedom
House scores’ in Table 1b. Equation (2) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under
scenario 3. Equation (3) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under scenario 4. Equation
(4) uses the fuzzy-transformed scores obtained under scenario 5.